National Security: Communication

NATIONAL SECURITY
Ill Communication

More than three years after 9/11, with the country's reputation plummeting
worldwide, America's strategic communication is "in a state of crisis." So
says a scathing report by the Defense Science Board Task Force, "a Federal
Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice" to the
Pentagon. The report concludes America has no clear message for the Muslim
world, nor a means of communicating that message. "Missing are strong
leadership, strategic direction, adequate coordination, sufficient
resources, and a culture of measurement and evaluation." The institutions
charged with battling the "war of ideas" are neglected, confused, or broken.
Conclusion? The United States has lost its "power to persuade." It lacks
even one "working channel of communication to the world of Muslims and of
Islam."

AIDING ADVERSARIES: The Defense Board concludes America's inept
communications strategy has failed in the fundamental non-military objective
of the fight against terrorism, "separating the vast majority of nonviolent
Muslims from the radical-militant Islamist-Jihadists." American efforts have
"not only failed in this respect. They may also have achieved the opposite
of what they intended," elevating the stature of radical Islamists, while
diminishing support for the United States to single-digits in many Arab
societies. The toxic combination of bad policy and inept public diplomacy
has left America's credibility so badly damaged that "whatever Americans do
and say only serves the party that has both the message and the 'loud and
clear' channel: the enemy."Â

COME OUT OF THE COLD: Part of the problem is the Bush administration's
over-reliance on Cold War models. "We must think in terms of global
networks, both government and non-government," the report says. "If we
continue to concentrate primarily on states…we will fail." The report
accuses the administration of reflexively adopting "Cold War-style responses
to the new threat, without a thought or a care as to whether these were the
best responses to a very different strategic situation." Indeed, President
Bush's elevation of former National Security Director Condoleezza Rice even
further underscores the point – Rice has insisted on using "Cold War
techniques" to fight the battle against terrorism.

WHITE HOUSE BURIED THE REPORT: So what did the Bush administration do with
the Defense Board's incisive critique of its communication strategies? The
report was delivered in September, but not made public until well after the
election, when it was "silently slipped" onto the Pentagon web site the
Wednesday night before Thanksgiving. This didn't stop spokesman Byran
Whitman from bragging the report's release was consistent with the
Pentagon's "guiding principle of making information available in a timely
and accurate manner."

THE BRIEF HISTORY OF THE OSI: The administration did try – briefly – to
develop a communications strategy. In late 2001, the Department of Defense
created an Office of Strategic Influence (OSI), to wage a "strategic
information campaign in support of the war on terrorism." The office,
however, was dissolved less than four months later, following reports it was
developing plans to plant false news items in the foreign press. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said the office had "clearly been so
damaged…that it could not function effectively."

THE NEW PLAN, SAME AS THE OLD PLAN: Alarmingly, however, the OSI's central
programs were never terminated. This week, the LA Times reported that "much
of OSI's mission…has been assumed by offices through the U.S. government,"
coordinated by Pentagon "misinformation" expert Douglas Feith. Trying to
psych out the insurgents, the offices recently duped CNN into reporting the
invasion of Fallujah was beginning, even though troops would not cross into
the city for three weeks. It is unlikely Feith and his fake stories were
what the Defense Board had in mind when it advised the U.S. to "search out
credible messengers and create message authority." Joint Chiefs Chairman
Gen. Richard Myers was been so alarmed by Feith's projects he wrote an
internal memo expressing concerns that U.S. military efforts "could suffer
if world audiences begin to question the honesty of statements from U.S.
commanders and spokespeople."